This study analyzes the effects of managerial ownership on the risk-taking behavior of Korean and Japanese banks during the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s to the early 2000s. It finds that managerial ownership alone does not affect either the risk or the profit levels of Korean banks. In contrast, an increase in managerial ownership adds to the total risk of Japanese banks. However, increased risk-taking behavior does not produce higher levels of profit for Japanese banks. The coefficients of the interaction term between franchise value and managerial ownership are negative and statistically significant for both the Korean and the Japanese banking industries. This means that an increase in managerial ownership at banks with high franchise values discourages risk-taking behavior. The result confirms the disciplinary role of franchise value on the risk-taking behavior of banks. It also falls in line with previous literature supporting the moral hazard hypothesis based on research into the economies of the U.S. and other countries.
I.

Introduction
Limited liability allows shareholders to keep all upside gains while sharing their losses with bondholders. Shareholders, therefore, have a strong incentive to increase risk.
Bondholders, particularly depositors, also have weak incentives to monitor and limit such risk-taking behavior because they are shielded from its consequences by the financial safety net of limited liability. This leads to the moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance. The monitoring function, therefore, falls on regulators, including deposit insurers.
However, many studies suggest that the incentives of bank managers may differ from those of external stockholders. If the managers largely invest in non-diversifiable (i.e., firm-specific) human capital, and managers of failed firms have difficulty finding comparable jobs due to a reputation for incompetence, they may act in a risk-averse rather than in a value-maximizing manner in order to keep their jobs (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ). This stockholder-manager agency conflict may help offset the moral hazard problem by aligning the interests of risk-averse bank managers with those of bank regulators.
Nevertheless, the conflict between stockholders and managers can be mitigated if the managers' interests are aligned with those of external stockholders. This can arise through insider ownership, which can be created when bank managers are compensated with stock or stock options, and are thus granted ownership of shares. While numerous studies have documented an inverse relationship between risk-taking by non-bank firms and managerial control, the conflict of interest is more complicated in the banking sector. This is because of the presence of bank regulators, who by their actions set the rules and regulations regarding risk-taking by banks. Less regulated environments can exacerbate stockholder-manager conflict over levels of risk-taking. Such conditions occur when, for example, business activities and interest rates are deregulated, or when closure rules are not strictly enforced. Deregulated environments give bank stockholders greater incentives and abilities to increase risk than tightly regulated ones do. In addition, ownership structure is expected to have a much stronger effect on the levels of risk taken by banks during periods of deregulation than during periods of regulation.
Franchise value-the present value of a firm's future economic profit as a going concern-also works to reduce the risk-taking incentives of banks. This is because banks with high franchise values have much to lose if a risky business strategy leads to insolvency. Therefore, franchise value helps to mitigate the moral hazard problem associated with the safety net. Keeley (1990) claims that the decline in franchise value of the US banks in the 1960s and 1970s can explain the increase in their risk-taking behavior in the 1980s. This paper examines the relationship between the ownership structure and risktaking behavior of banks in Korea and Japan during the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s through the mid-2000s. The literature about the effect of managerial ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks is mainly based upon U.S. banking experiences of the 1980s. Moreover, it differs on the exact relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking. Therefore, an examination of the relationship between ownership structure and the risk-taking of banks in Korea and Japan could provide better insight into the issue.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Following the introduction, Section II describes the backgrounds of the financial industries in Korea and Japan. Section III reviews the literature on the relationship between the ownership structure and risk-taking behavior of banks. Section IV investigates the empirical model and explains the data employed in this research. Section V presents the results of the empirical estimations, while Section VI concludes the study.
II. The Backgrounds of the Financial Industries in Korea and Japan
This further promoting the structural change of the Korean and Japanese banking industries in the decade that followed.
Until the mid-1990s, the governments of Korea and Japan intervened heavily in the management of banks through measures such as credit allocation and the appointment of bank CEOs. In those years, neither ownership structure nor franchise value was related to the risk-taking behavior of individual banks. This was especially true in Japan, which introduced what is commonly dubbed as the financial convoy system. 1 In Korea, too, the government placed heavy impositions on bank management, although to a lesser extent.
Under these financially repressed circumstances, the levels of risk taken by banks were not reflected in their balance sheets, nor were differentiating strategies even necessary.
However, the governments began to promote financial liberalization and deregulation in the mid-1990s in order to enhance the competitiveness of their respective banking industries. They deregulated interest rates and permitted new banks to enter the market while implicitly protecting banks so that they would survive. As a result, competition grew intense and banks engaged in aggressive risk-taking behavior, which combined with governmental forbearance from bank closure to become one of the main causes of the 1997 financial crisis as experienced in Korea, and of the prolonged sluggishness of the Japanese banking sector.
The Korean Banking Industry
The 1988 BIS capital standard was introduced to the Korean banking industry in 1992, but was not implemented until 1996. Following the 1997 financial crisis, BIS capital standards were further tightened. Lee (2000) studied the relationship between risktaking and capital regulation in the Korean banking sector during the 1990s, and finds that capital and risk levels are positively related. In addition, Chun and Lee (2000) look at the effects of strict capital regulation at the end of the 1997 financial crisis, and find that it forced commercial banks to reduce their ownership of risky assets. This led to the socalled credit crunch, which worsened the economic recession caused by the financial crisis (Chun and Lee, 2000).
The Korean banking sector underwent comprehensive financial restructuring after the 1997 financial crisis. At the end of 1997, supervisory bodies were consolidated into a controlling agent, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), and BIS capital regulations were tightly enforced. In 1998, accounting standards were strengthened with the classification rule for non-performing loans aligned to the best international practices.
Forward-looking criteria were also employed. Further, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) was used to restructure individual financial institutions. When the first round of financial restructuring was completed in the context of a stabilized financial market at the end of 1999, a partial deposit insurance guarantee system was introduced. This was meant to alleviate the moral hazard problem associated with the deposit insurance system, and to introduce market discipline in the banking sector. 
The Japanese Banking Industry
In Japan, financial liberalization was initially introduced in 1979, and was strongly encouraged by the government and the new trend of international regulation imposed by the BIS during the first half of the 1990s. Consequently, the Japanese banking sector experienced dramatic structural change in the 1990s. Financial liberalization was generally complete when the time deposit interest rate was deregulated in 1994. During the first 1990s, the entire commercial banking sector performed quite soundly, while some non-bank firms declared insolvency.
Between 1996 and 1998, during the Hashimoto administration, the Japanese government conducted another comprehensive round of financial reforms, which is known as the Japanese Big Bang. They made it possible to establish financial holding firms without obtaining prior approval from the financial authorities, and sanctioned regulatory changes that liberalized market entry requirements. Between 1998 and 2006, there were fourteen bank mergers, three major corporate reorganizations, and four transfers of business operations from bankrupt banks. 3 The bank merger wave resulted in significant structural changes in the deposit and lending markets, which became remarkably concentrated during this period. While competition increased in metropolitan areas, the banking sector remained oligopolistic in local cities.
These differing degrees of ownership concentration across metropolitan areas and local cities have resulted in varying bank franchise values. Literature surveying the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Korean or the Japanese banking sector only examines the 1990s, and neglects to explore the interaction between franchise value and managerial ownership. In contrast, this paper focuses on the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and examines the disciplinary role of franchise value by taking account of the interaction between franchise value and managerial ownership. In doing so, it tests the moral hazard hypothesis, and obtains insights on the agency problem and the disciplinary role of franchise value in periods of relative financial stability in Korea and Japan. It also investigates whether risktaking behavior resulting from increased levels of managerial ownership leads to higher profits.
III. Literature Review and Hypotheses
IV. Empirical Model and Data
Model
We use the panel estimation model, which combines data for various commercial banks over the sample periods in equation (1) 
We capture the differences in cross-sectional bank units by specifying an intercept coefficient for each cross-sectional unit in the panel model, and estimate the difference in intercepts using dummy variables. This is a fixed effects model because the regression line is raised or lowered by a fixed amount for each individual. However, individual difference can also be treated as random disturbance drawn from specified distribution in a random effects model, in which case, it becomes part of the model's disturbance term The method of ordinary least squares is the best unbiased linear estimator for fixed effects models, and the method of generalized least squares is the best unbiased linear estimator for random effects models. Random effects models require no correlation between the regressors and the individual attributes represented by intercept coefficients.
The Hausman specification test was employed to choose between the fixed effects model and the random effects model, and its rejection of the null hypothesis suggested that the random effects model was not appropriate and that the fixed effect models should be employed (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). Inside .
The monitoring of managerial risk-taking could be affected by the structure of ownership as well as by the regulatory structure. We include Q represents the franchise value of bank j at time t-1. In order to take account of the fact that risk-taking behavior is affected by the previous year's franchise value rather than by the current one, franchise value was lagged. Tobin's q, defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement costs of its assets, is an attractive theoretical measure with which to determine franchise value. 7 Following Keeley's (1990) technique for deriving a proxy for franchise value, we used a simple estimator of q, the sum of the market value of common equity (price per share times number of shares) plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets.
To examine the interaction between managerial stock ownership and franchise value, we added the slope interaction variable Although we chose the capital-to-asset ratio to signify financial leverage, the equity-to-asset ratio is also one of the most commonly used proxies for bank risk. When equity levels are low, bank risk is high; this is because capital represents collateral used the capital-to-asset ratio as a proxy for bank risk in their studies of Japanese banks.
Lastly, write-offs for loan losses could be used as another measure of bank risk (Gorton and Rosen, 1995). We also used the variable jt CAP as a dependent variable for bank risk in Korea and Japan, and report the results of estimations thus derived. In addition, we employed the ratio of write-offs to total assets as a dependent variable representing risk appetite in Japanese banks. 8 The final control variable is jt FA , the fixed asset ratio (i.e., the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets) of the Return on assets (ROA) was also used as an independent variable in a separate model in order to analyze the effects of insider ownership and franchise value on the profitability of banks. The banking system differs between the two countries. For example, keiretsu banks in Japan extract rents from their client firms (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) in exchange for maintaining close relationships with them. These banks pressure their client firms to maintain high levels of bank debt at high interest rates. Therefore, they are likely to be more profitable than other types of banks. To see whether this affects the ROA for Japanese banks, we included an additional equation with a keiretsu dummy variable for Japanese banks.
Data
We used panel data on commercial banks from the relatively regulated periods of 1997 to 2005 for Korea and 1996 to 2006 for Japan. Since bank risks are measured by capital market risk, sample banks should be listed on a stock exchange. The number of listed banks varies greatly during the sample periods because the banking sectors were undergoing financial restructuring, and merged banks are treated as new banks. Table 1 shows the number of banks surveyed per year.
Table 1 here
Our panel is unbalanced, and the estimations could be biased by the selection of only surviving banks. This is because riskier banks presumably drop out of the sample on a more frequent basis. Further, new entrants may assume different risk-taking behaviors from existing banks. It is widely recognized that, when this is the case, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates suffer from selection bias. Therefore, we apply a two-step Japanese stock market data (i.e., the Tokyo stock market index and the stock prices of individual banks) were procured from FinancialQuest, the online database of the Japanese business newspaper publisher NIKKEI, while ownership data were from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. The financial data on commercial banks are from the "Kaisha Zaimu Karte" of the Tokyo Keizai Shimpo. Table 2 shows the list of variables and their description. The mean value of log of total asset is 23.75, and the average capital-to-asset ratio for the banks in the sample is 4.28 percent. The fixed-asset-to-total asset ratio has an average of 3.28 percent, with maximum and minimum values of 7.91 percent and 1.28 percent, respectively. The ROA mean is 7.81 percent, with a standard deviation of 2.76 percent. Table 3 here Table 4 describes the statistics for the sample of the Japanese banking sector, which covers the years of 1996 to 2006. It shows that the level of total risk, measured as the standard deviation of weekly stock return series, is 1.84 percent. This is lower than the total risk level of Korean banks. Further, the mean level of unsystematic risk is also lower than in the Korean data. The average level of insider ownership is 0.89 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.32 percent. Generally, insider ownership ratios are high for local banks and low for banks with headquarters in the metropolitan area. The Japanese banks have a mean franchise value of one, which is as high as that of the Korean banks. The mean value of the log of total asset is 14.67,while the average capital adequacy ratio and average fixed assets ratio divided by total asset ratio is 4.62 percent and 1.68 percent, respectively. ROA mean has a negative value of 0.09 percent. This is consistent with previous research and the "too big to fail" doctrine. Our results also show that the capital-to-asset ratio does not significantly affect the risk level of banks. As expected, the fixed asset ratio increases the levels of total risk and unsystematic risk in the model. Finally, the positive and statistically significant coefficients of the yearly dummy variables for the years of 1997 to 2002 reflect the unfavorable banking environment engendered by high levels of risk. Inside do not affect bank profits to a significant degree. Thus, managerial ownership affects neither bank risk as examined in Table 5 , nor banking profitability as examined after controlling for franchise value. Contrary to our expectations, franchise value reduces banks profit after it is controlled for managerial ownership. Conversely, the interaction term between managerial ownership and franchise value does not influence bank profits. Elsewhere, the capital-to-asset ratio positively affects banking profitability, while the fixed asset ratio sways it in a negative direction. The negative and significant coefficients of the dummy variables for the years of 1997 to 2000 reflect the unfavorable banking environment of the time. Table 5 here Table 6 here 3. Empirical Results for Japan Table 7 presents the estimations for Japan. As for Korea, the estimations of the fixed effects models are presented in cases where the Hausman specification test rejected the random effects model. In addition, the two-step Heckman procedure was administered to correct the sample bias in the Japanese banking industry, and the results are presented in Appendix II. When all three risk measures are used as dependent variables, the parameters estimated by the OLS method and the Heckman procedure are similar, and the Mills ratio is very small and insignificant. These results imply that the model contains no sample bias.
Descriptive Statistics
After controlling for the influence of franchise value, the model analyzes increases in managerial ownership for their propensity to increase total risk. It finds that managerial ownership does not affect levels of unsystematic or systematic risk. However, franchise value reduces both types of risk. In particular, its role in reducing levels of systematic risk maintains a one percent significance level. The coefficients of the interaction term for franchise value and managerial ownership are negative and significant, maintaining a five percent significance level for total risk and a one percent significance level for unsystematic and systematic risk. These results confirm that franchise value disciplines risk-taking behavior in the Japanese banking industry, just as it does in the Korean banking industry.
The estimations show that external block holders of Japanese banks do not affect risk levels. This falls in with the predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis.
Asset size particularly increases levels of total risk, thereby supporting the notion of "too big to fail." The results also confirm that total risk falls as the capital-to-asset ratio rises, and that the parameters of the ratio of write-offs to assets are entirely insignificant, probably because the variable excludes bad loans from write-off expenses. Table 8 shows the estimations that use ROA as a proxy for banking profitability, which is then used as a dependent variable. By regressing the independent variables in profit calculations, we can examine the corporate control hypothesis, which states that increased risk-taking behavior resulting from an increase in managerial ownership should produce larger profits. However, increases in total risk resulting from increased managerial ownership do not lead to higher profits for Japanese banks. This result is commonly obtained when the keiretsu dummies are added. Table 7 here Table 8 here
VI. Conclusion
Bank stockholders have greater incentives and abilities to increase risk in deregulated environments than they do in tightly regulated ones. This is documented by the existing literature, which demonstrates that ownership structure tends to have much a stronger effect on the levels of risk taken by banks during deregulated periods than it does during regulated ones. Our study contributes to the literature by analyzing the effect of managerial ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Korean and Japanese banking industries during the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s to early 2000s.
We experiment with a model that includes the variables of managerial ownership and franchise value, which are used to produce an interaction term.
Managerial ownership affects neither the risk levels nor the profit levels of Korean banks. In contrast, increases in managerial ownership heighten the total risks of Japanese banks. However, this increase in risk does not produce higher profits for Japanese banks. *** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level
Variables "Dropped" due to collinearity problem 1 The convoy banking system originated in the desire of Japanese bank regulators to prioritize financial stability over all else in the design of their regulatory regime. This system constrained all the banks within it to grow at the same pace, in a manner similar to how ships in a convoy are required to move at the pace of their slowest member. In addition, the convoy rescue system placed the burden of resolving bank failures on the banking system itself. Instead of liquidating failing banks through a deposit insurance regime, regulators merged it with a healthy bank. This "convoy approach" may have played a role in the system's poor performance.
2 In early 1998, the Korea First Bank and the Seoul Bank were offered to foreign investors through an agreement with IMF. Five ailing banks were merged with healthy banks through P&A procedures. In 1999, the 
